The credit crisis was sparked by a shock to fundamentals, housing prices failed to rise, which led to a collapse of trust in credit markets. In particular, the repurchase agreement market in the U.S., estimated to be about $12 trillion, larger than the total assets in the U.S. banking system ($10 trillion), became very illiquid during the crisis due to the fear of counterparty default, leaving lenders with illiquid bonds that they did not want, believing that they could not be sold. As a result, there was an increase in repo haircuts (the initial margin), causing massive deleveraging. I investigate this indirectly, by looking at the breakdown in the arbitrage foundation of the ABX.HE indices during the panic. The ABX.HE indices of subprime mortgage-backed securities are derivatives linked to the underlying subprime bonds. Introduced in 2006, the indices aggregated and revealed information about the value of the subprime mortgage-backed securities and allowed parties to buy protection against declines in subprime value via credit derivatives written on the index or tranches of the index. When the ABX prices plummeted, the arbitrage relationships linking the credit derivatives linked to the index and the underlying bonds broke down because liquidity evaporated in the repo market. This breakdown allows a glimpse of the information problems that led to illiquidity in the repo markets, and the extent of the demand for protection against subprime risk.
Introduction
The credit crisis was sparked by a shock to fundamentals, housing prices failed to rise, which then led to a collapse of trust in credit markets. To shed light on this, I investigate the relationship between two markets, one for cash securities and one synthetic. The first market is the repurchase market, estimated to be about $12 trillion, larger than the total assets in the U.S. banking system. This market has grown to play a crucial intermediation role for asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities, especially as the intermediation has shifted out of the traditional banking sector. The other market is the synthetic market for subprime residential mortgage risk, which can be traded via the ABX.HE indices, derivatives linked to underlying subprime bonds.
The ABX indices played several important roles in the panic. Starting in January 2006, the indices were the only place where a subprime-related instrument traded in a transparent way, aggregating and revealing information about the value of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). Other subprime-related instruments, RMBS bonds, Collateralized Debt Obligation tranches, Structured Investment Vehicles' liabilities, and so on, do not trade in visible markets and there are no secondary markets. See Gary Gorton (2008) . Also, the ABX allowed for hedging subprime risk. These two markets are linked by an arbitrage relationship, but this breaks down during the crisis, an indication of the disappearance of the repo market for subprime-related instruments.
During the panic, and continuing today, the repo market shrank dramatically, drying up completely for subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), because of counterparty risk. The inability to buy or sell the underlying subprime bonds, combined with the overwhelming demand for hedging via derivatives linked to the ABX can be seen in the "basis," the difference in spreads between the ABX index and the underlying cash bonds. Though there are frictions, the basis should be small, but it explodes during the panic, an indication of the disappearance of the repo market for these bonds.
I.
The ABX Indices and the Panic
The panic, starting in 2007, is described by Gorton (2008) . Subprime mortgages featured a unique security design that depended on home price appreciation; the mortgages were essentially short maturity, requiring refinancing. In 2006 and 2007 a total of $1.2 trillion of subprime mortgages were originated, of which 80 percent was securitized. The securitization of subprime mortgages also had a unique design, reflecting the home price sensitivity of the mortgages, and involving a dynamic build-up of credit enhancement as the underlying mortgages refinanced, paying cash into the securitization. Rated tranches of subprime securitizations were sold into collateralized debt obligations, tranches of which were in turn sold to structured investment vehicles, and so on. This chain of linked structured securities depended on house prices, and the final location of these risks -the end investors -are not known.
As long as house prices appreciated, subprime mortgages could be refinanced, and the various structured securities linked to subprime mortgages were attractive investments. House price appreciation was positive over the period when subprime mortgages were issued in arbitrage should work as follows. If S CDS -S cash is less than R CF , then an arbitrageur should buy the bond and buy protection on the bond via the ABX index, thereby eliminating the credit risk, and earning a return greater than R CF . If S CDS -S cash is greater than R CF , then the arbitrageur should short the risk bond and write protection via the ABX instrument, again earning the difference. For details, see, e.g., Darrell Duffie (1999) . This suggests that S CDS -S cash should equal R CF ; the cost of funding is discussed further below.
I examine the basis with daily spread data from a dealer bank. The ABX index prices were converted to spreads by the bank. 3 The subprime bonds are floating rate. The bank collects spreads for primary issuance or secondary spreads if these are observed. The subprime spreads series end after February 7, 2008 because of a lack of trading. The subprime bond spreads are not the exact bonds referenced by the ABX index because these did not trade. But, the arbitrage could be conducted using on-the-run subprime bonds that were reasonable substitutes. I focus on the BBB tranche of the ABX index, and also look at the 2006-01 vintage because this is the lo Figure 2 shows the basis for the BBB tranche of the ABX index during its first year of existence. The basis moves within a fairly narrow range, varying between 34 and -22 basis points, a fairly tight range. The basis should be compared to the cost of funding (or the amount earned), which is the repo rate. For example, suppose LIBOR is 3.1 percent. Suppose, in the repo market, that the haircut for this bond is 10 percent and that the repo rate is LIBOR plus 10
3 The dealer bank's methodology for computing ABX spreads is, briefly, as follows: (1) the bank uses their proprietary model to project prepays/defaults/losses/durations, etc, using base case home price appreciation assumption (-15% 1yr, -3% 1yrs, 0% 2yrs, +3% rest); (2) The bank uses the risky duration computed above, along with the market price (to get upfront payment) and the constant coupon to obtain the par spread for the index. So, the parameters for the spread computations are: the upfront premiums (market observed); the ABX coupon, which is constant); and the risky duration, which is computed from the proprietary model computed. Roughly, the equation used is: Spread = (Upfront / Risky Duration) + ABX Coupon.
basis points. Then, in a negative basis trade, for a bond priced at $100, the cost of funding is ($100 -($100*10%))*(LIBOR +10 bp) = $90*3.2%= $2.88.
To complete the example, if the bond pays LIBOR plus 100 basis points (bps) and the cost of protection is 60 bps, then the income on the transaction is $100*(3.1%+100-60) = $3.5. So,
initially the arbitrage appears profitable. The example shows how the repo market is crucial to keeping the basis narrow.
III. The Repo Market
Repo is likely one of the largest financial markets, although there are no official statistics on the size of the market. Repo is integral to intermediation by dealer banks because when assets are purchased for sale later the assets are financed by repo. Repos are essentially secured loans, so counterparty risk is usually not an issue. According to Timothy Geithner (2008) , tripartite repo was $2.5 trillion in 2007. 4 Tripartite repo is estimated to be about 15 -20 percent of the repo market 5 , making the total market about $12 trillion (including repo and reverse repo), compared to total assets in the U.S. banking system of $10 trillion (see Geithner 2008) . Second, the plummeting ABX prices revealed the decline in value of subprime bonds, leading to massive demands for hedging, reflected in the low ABX prices and high spreads. Figure 2 provides a glimpse of the liquidity crisis, which was coincident with the fall in house prices and 4 In tripartite repo a custodian bank or clearing organization acts as an intermediary between the two repo parties. There is no data that I know of that quantifies the amount of bilateral repo. Table 1 shows the repo market haircuts for different collateral at different points in time.
Of particular relevance are the first two columns of the table. The implications of this are very dramatic. Imagine a firm that is levered 30:1, by borrowing in the repo market. If the haircut doubles, or goes from zero to a positive amount, the required deleveraging is massive! Most investment banks were levered 30:1, equivalent to about a 3 percent haircut. If the haircut rises to 6 percent, at least half the assets will have to be sold.
Another sign of trouble is a "repo fail." A "repo fail" occurs when one side of the agreement fails to abide by the contract. 6 Table 2 shows repo fails by primary government security dealers, greatly exceeding previous episodes of stress in the repo market. What happened in the repo market? Dealer banks would not accept collateral because they rightly believed that if they had to seize the collateral, should the counterparty fail, then there would be no market in which to sell it. This was due to the absence of buyers because of the deleveraging. This led to an absence of prices for these securities. If that value cannot be 6 This event is not considered a contractual default in the repo market. See Michael Fleming and Kenneth Garbade (2005). determined, because there is no market -no liquidity -or there is the concern that if the asset is seized by the lender, it will not be saleable at all, then the lender will not engage in repo. Repo traders report that there was uncertainty about whether to believe the ratings on these structured products, and in a very fast moving environment, the response was to pull back from accepting anything structured. If no one would accept structured products for repo, then these bonds could not be traded -and then no one would want to accept them in repo transactions.
IV. Conclusion
The decline in the ABX prices revealed the shock to the valuation of subprime risk, but it did not reveal where these risks resided. That uncertainty caused a loss of confidence in credit.
This can be seen in the breakdown in the arbitrage foundation of the ABX.HE indices during the panic. The explosive behavior of the basis shows that the concern about the location of the risks led to fear of counterparty default, especially in the repo markets, where defaults would lead to delivery of bonds that could not be sold. These problems in the repo market are very significant because the repurchase agreement market in the U.S. is estimated to be $12 trillion, larger than the total assets in the U.S. banking system. This market is central to the "shadow banking system," the nexus of structured vehicles that issues bonds into the capital markets (see Gorton   2008 ). This short-term financing market became very illiquid during the crisis and an increase in repo haircuts (the initial margin) caused massive deleveraging. If no one would accept structured products for repo, then these bonds could not be traded -and then no one would want to accept them in a repo transaction. This externality is reminiscent of Marco Pagano (1989) . The extreme stress in the repo market can even be seen in the repo market for U.S. government securities, where the instances of "repo fails" where borrowed securities have not been returned on time have reached a record.
